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JURISDICTION 
The parties agree that this Court has appellate jurisdiction over this appeal 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(j). 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Appellee has not challenged the standard of review set forth in Appellant's 
opening brief on the five issues stated therein. Appellee has also not challenged 
Appellant's assertion that the issues before this Court are issues of law concerning 
the interpretation of certified court dockets, Utah statutes, unambiguous loan 
documents, and the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
REPLY TO STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
Of the five issues presented in Appellant's opening brief, Appellee now 
concedes the second issue which asserts that Horbach's petition for certiorari was 
indeed timely filed with the Utah Supreme Court before the 30-day period for the 
filing of such a petition had expired. 
STATUTES AND RULES 
The statutes and Riles which the parties assert to be important or controlling 
are Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2 (appellate jurisdiction), Utah Code Ann. § 78-22-1 (the 
judgment lien statute) and Rule 36 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 
(remittitur) (both the 1995 and present versions thereof). 
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REPLY TO STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In its opening brief, Appellant sets forth thirty-five paragraphs of facts, which 
Appellee has not challenged. Conversely, Appellee sets forth fourteen paragraphs of 
facts in its brief and Appellant responds to paragraphs 2 and 6 as follows. 
Concerning paragraph 2, Appellant disagrees with Appellee's suggestion that 
the opinion of the Utah Court of Appeals was intended to be a self-executing order 
which vacated the District Court's Judgment. (Appellee's Brief, Statement of Facts, 
paragraph 2.) Rather, on October 19, 1995, the Utah Court of Appeals issued its 
written opinion which mandates, in relevant part, as follows: 
Because we conclude the trial court erred when it held the accord and 
satisfaction unenforceable for lack of consideration and because we 
conclude the agreement was not founded upon a mutual mistake of fact, 
we reverse and remand for further action consistent with this 
opinion, 
England v. Horbach et al, 905 P.2d 301, 305 (Utah Ct App. 1995) (emphasis 
added)(.see Appellant's Exhibit G (5), page 6). Appellant asserts that the foregoing 
language is clear, unambiguous and not subject to reasonable dispute that the Court 
of Appeals remanded the case for further action by the District Court consistent with 
its opinion. 
Concerning paragraph 6, Appellant does not dispute that the Court of Appeals 
issued a remittitur to the District Court on November 22, 1995. However, on 
November 20, 1995, two days before such remittitur, the Utah Supreme Court sent 
? 
formal written notice to the District Court that a petition for certiorari had been filed 
with the Utah Supreme Court by Mr. Horbach. (See Supreme Court Docket, Exhibit 
G (3), page 1.) The foregoing notice was entered on the District Court's docket on 
November 20, 1995. (See Certified District Court Docket, Exhibit G (1), page 18.) 
The notice gave notice to anyone searching the judgment docket that the Judgment 
was subject to further review by this Court. (A copy of the foregoing notice is 
attached as Appellant's Exhibit G (6).) This Court granted the petition for certiorari 
and filed a formal notice with the District Court that certiorari had been granted 
several months before the trust deed, from which Appellee's interest arose, was 
recorded against the judgment debtor's property. (Compare Certified District Court 
Docket, Exhibit G (1), page 18, to the dates on trust deed at Appellant's Exhibit G 
(8)). 
REPLY - POINT I 
HORBACH'S PETITION FOR CERTIORARI WAS TIMELY FILED 
Appellant has demonstrated that the District Court's Memorandum Decision 
incorrectly concluded that Horbach (i.e., the judgment creditor) filed his petition for 
certiorari on November 24, 1995, after "the Court of Appeals remitted the case back 
to the District Court." This Court's certified docket reflects that Horbach filed his 
petition for certiorari with this Court on November 20, 2001, which was before the 
30-day period for the filing of such petitions expired, and before the clerk of the 
Court of Appeals attempted to remit the appellate record to the District Court. 
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In response, Appellee concedes now for the first time, that Horbach's petition 
for certiorari was indeed timely filed. Appellee argues, however, that the District 
Court's error is without effect. Appellant disagrees. Appellant asserts that Judge 
Henriod's decision was based, in part, on the premise that jurisdiction over the 
Judgment re-vested with the District Court because Horbach's petition for certiorari 
was not filed within the 30-day period provided by the Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
This is evidenced by the District Court's ruling which provides in relevant part as 
follows: 
In this case, on October 19, 1995, the Court of Appeals issued a 
decision reversing and remanding the District Court's Order. Then, on 
November 22,1995, more than thirty days after, the Court of 
Appeals remitted the case back to the District Court. Shortly 
thereafter, on November 24,1995, defendant filed a petition for 
certiorari in the Utah Supreme Court. 
Based upon this sequence of events defendant contends that 
after remittitur the District Court did not obtain proper 
jurisdiction and consequently could [not] modify its judgment in 
accordance with the instructions of the Court of Appeals, 
However, defendant's petition for certiorari was only granted after 
the Court of Appeals sent the case back to the District Court and 
after the thirty-day waiting period had expired . . . 
Memorandum Decision, Exhibit H, page 2 (emphasis added). Based upon the 
foregoing language, there is little doubt that the District Court concluded that the 
petition for certiorari was filed after, the thirty-day period had expired. Indeed, the 
District Court's conclusion that the petition for writ of certiorari was not timely filed 
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was a primary basis for its decision that the opinion of the Court of Appeals became 
operative before this Court had completed its review of the Judgment. 
Appellant also disagrees with Appellee's argument that the mere fact that the 
petition for certiorari was timely filed does not affect this Court's appellate 
jurisdiction. Had the petition for certiorari not been timely filed, this Court would 
have been without appellate jurisdiction to review the Judgment. However, because 
the petition for certiorari was timely filed, this Court acquired appellate jurisdiction 
to review the appropriateness of the Judgment made and entered by the District Court 
and the opinion of the Court of Appeals relating thereto. 
REPLY-POINT II 
THE DISTRICT COURT'S FINDINGS 
AND CONCLUSIONS ARE ERRONEOUS 
A. APPELLEE'S INTERPRETATION OF RULE 36 IS INACCURATE 
Appellee's interpretation of Rule 36 is inaccurate for the following reasons. 
First, the interpretation is inconsistent with this Court's controlling case authority in 
Hi-Country Estates Home-Owners Association v. Foothills Water Co., 942 P.2d 305 
(Utah 1996) and White v. State of Utah, 795 P.2d 648 (Utah 1990). 
Second, Appellee's interpretation of the law is contrary to the subsequent 
clarifications made to Rule 36 by this Court. Third, the interpretation is contrary to 
Utah R. App. P. 1(d), which provides that the Rules of Appellate Procedure shall not 
be construed to extend or limit jurisdiction in such a fashion. 
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In support of one of its arguments, Appellee argues that its interpretation of 
Rule 36 must be correct because the Rule provides that "[t]he time for issuance of the 
remittitur may be stayed, enlarged or shortened by order the Court." However, 
Appellee's argument is unpersuasive because the same identical language is found in 
Rule 36 in its present form even though subsection (b) of the Rule has been amended 
by this Court to clarify that remittitur is automatically stayed when a petition for 
certiorari is timely filed. See Utah R. App. P. 36(a)(3). 
B. THE RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE CANNOT BE 
CONSTRUED TO EXTEND OR LIMIT APPELLATE 
JURISDICTION 
Appellee argues throughout much of its brief that the Court of Appeals' 
opinion operated to vacate the District Court's Judgment because the record on 
appeal was remitted under Rule 36. Again, this argument contradicts this Court's 
holdings in Hi-Country and White\ wherein this Court has held that it is well settled 
in Utah that the trial court is divested of jurisdiction over a case while it is under 
advisement on appeal. Appellee's argument is also inconsistent with the Rules of 
Appellate Procedure which provide "[tjhese rules shall not be constructed to extend 
or limit the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court or Court of Appeals as established by 
law" (emphasis added). Utah R. App P. 1(d). 
Notwithstanding the foregoing, Appellee misconstrues Rule 36 of the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure (despite the subsequent clarifications which have been 
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made to Rule 36), and oddly suggests that somehow the District Court's Judgment 
was vacated even though the District Court never regained jurisdiction over the 
Judgment until the appeal process was completed. Again, the Court of Appeals' 
opinion remanded the case with instructions. The opinion does not provide that it 
would become effective through a remittitur of the record but rather, it remanded the 
case with instructions. 
This Court's unequivocal pronouncement of the law is that a trial court is 
divested of jurisdiction over a judgment while the judgment is under advisement on 
appeal. See Hi-Country Estates Home-Owners Association v. Foothills Water Co., 
942 P.2d 305 (Utah 1996); Accord, White v. State of Utah, 795 P.2d 648 (Utah 1990) 
("This court has long followed the general rule that the trial court is divested of 
jurisdiction over a case while it is under advisement on appeal.") 
Appellant attempts to distinguish Hi-Country from the case at bar by 
suggesting that the holding in Hi-Country is based and contingent upon the Court of 
Appeals' (1) prematurely issued remittitur of the record to the District Court; and (2) 
the failure to grant Foothill's request for a stay of the remittitur. [Brief of Appellee at 
14-15.] Although this Court apparently considered these issues as additional error 
committed by the Court of Appeals, this Court did not hold that a premature 
remittitur and/or a failure by a party to request a stay of the remittitur are necessary 
prerequisites before a district court is divested of jurisdiction on appeal. Indeed, all 
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that is needed to divest a district court of jurisdiction over a case is a pending appeal 
in the Court of Appeals or the Utah Supreme Court. Id. at 307, Again, the current 
version of Rule 36 reflects and harmonizes with this Court's decisions in Hi-Country 
and White.1 
In contrast, Appellee's interpretation of the language in Rule 36 would be 
inconsistent with this Court's holdings in Hi-Countiy and White, and Utah R. App P. 
1(d). However, if Rule 36 (prior to its amendment) is interpreted as Appellant 
suggests, the Rule harmonizes with the foregoing controlling case law on appellate 
jurisdiction, the provisions of Utah R. App P . 1(d), and the subsequent amendments 
made to Rule 36. 
In one of its arguments, Appellant argues non sequitur that if Rule 36 was 
amended to conform to the law pronounced in High-County and White, then why do 
these cases not discuss the amendments to Rule 36. Obviously, if Rule 36 was 
amended to be in harmony with this Court's prior decisions, the subsequent 
amendments would not have been discussed in those decisions, which were prior in 
time. In contrast, Appellee gives no explanation why Rule 36 was amended by this 
Court to harmonize with controlling law. Notwithstanding, even if there were a 
conflict between Rule 36 and this Court's case authority on the issue of appellate 
The current version of Rule 36 states in relevant part: "If a petition for writ of certiorari is 
timely filed, issuance of the remittitur by the Court of Appeals will automatically be stayed 
until the Supreme Court's disposition on the petition for writ of certiorari." 
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jurisdiction pending appeal, the later would control because the Rules are not to be 
construed to extend or limit jurisdiction. See Utah R. App. P . 1(d). 
The case authority cited by Appellant is inapplicable for a number reasons. 
The decision of Owens v. Hewell, 474 S.E.2d 740 (Ga. App. 1996), deals with 28 
U.S. § 2101(f), which Congress enacted in connection with petitions for certiorari 
filed with the United States Supreme Court. While the case is irrelevant to this case, 
the case and statute cited therein support Appellant's argument. Indeed, the statute 
indicates that it is dealing with a stay of the execution, i.e., the enforcement of an 
affirmative judgment. In addition, the decision provides that in the Eighth Circuit a 
lower court's judgment is stayed automatically when a petition for certiorari has been 
granted. 
In Wheeler v. Goulart, 623 A.2d 1177 (D.C. App. 1993), the court found that 
"jurisdiction had re-vested in the trial court" on a judgment wherein a reporter had 
been found in contempt. However, the matter was settled before the appeal was 
addressed by the reviewing court. Thereafter, the reporter sought to have the 
decision of the trial court vacated, but the reviewing court would not allow the 
vacation of the order of contempt entered against the reporter. The case is factually 
distinguishable from the present case. More importantly, the case is irrelevant 
because it involves different statutes, rules and procedures than those in Utah. 
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In the In re Estate of Harold Grabow, 392 N.E.2d 980 (111. App. Ct. 1979), the 
court was addressing the interpretation of the specific rules of the supreme court of 
Illinois, which provided that mandates are immediately enforceable under its rules. 
There are no similar rules in Utah. The case merely demonstrates that different 
states have different rules on the issue of appellate jurisdiction. 
In Blum v. Coldwell, 446 U.S. 1311 (1980), the United States Supreme Court 
denied the petitioners' request for a stay pending appeal. The Court denied a stay of 
the injunctive relief ordered by the United States District Court, as affirmed by the 
Second Circuit Court of Appeals, which enjoined the commissioner of New York 
from denying social service benefits to certain applicants. The Court denied the 
motion for stay because it determined that it was highly unlikely that a petition for 
certiorari would be granted and because Congress was considering legislation to 
amend the act in question. The case has no applicability to the case at bar in which 
certiorari was filed and granted with respect to the Judgment before the debtor 
encumbered his property with a trust deed. 
Finally, Bulmash v. Davis, 24 Cal.3d 691, 597 P.2d 469 (1979), is easily 
distinguished from the present case because the rules and procedures in California are 
distinct from those adopted by this Court and the State of Utah. Moreover, the 
judgment in that case, which had to be recorded like a deed in order to create a lien, 
had been vacated on the county records and there was no notice on those records that 
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an appeal had been filed. Thus, the buyer lacked knowledge that there may have 
been a potential judgment lien against the property. The court also found that the 
buyer did not have actual or constructive notice that the vacated judgment had been 
appealed. In Utah, a judgment lien does not arise from the recording of the judgment 
on the county records but rather from the entry of the judgment on the District Court 
docket. As such, those dealing with the debtor's property would have had notice that 
the Judgment remained on the docket and that a petition for certiorari had been filed 
and granted by the Utah Supreme Court. In addition, the buyers in Bulmash did not 
buy from a foreclosure sale wherein no warranty of title was given by the trustee.2 
C. REMITTITUR DOES NOT CONTROL JURISDICTION 
Even if a record on appeal is remitted by the Court of Appeals to the District 
Court, the remittitur does not control the appellate jurisdiction of this Court. Once 
this Court has undertaken appellate jurisdiction over a judgment on appeal, neither 
the Court of Appeals nor the District Court can divest this Court of its appellate 
jurisdiction. Again, in Hi-Country this Court stated: "[T]he Court of Appeals erred 
in remitting the case before the time to seek certiorari had expired under the rules and 
erred again when it refused to recall its erroneously issued remittitur. The judgment 
of the district court is void because that court had no jurisdiction to enter a judgment 
" Appellee's interest came through a trustee's deed which gave no warranty of title to the 
subject property. (See Appellant's Exhibit G(l 1)). 
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while the case was still pending in the appellate courts. The district court judgment is 
vacated as void." See Hi-Country Estates, 942 P.2d at 307. Surely, this Court's 
decision would have been the same had the clerk of the Court of Appeals improperly 
remitted the record to the District Court after a timely petition for certiorari had been 
filed with this Court. 
D. HORBACH'S JUDGMENT LIEN AROSE BY OPERATION OF 
LAW 
Appellee's argument that Horbach should have obtained a stay of execution 
pending appeal is illogical and disconnected. Horbach's judgment lien arose by 
operation of law pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-22-1, and not by a writ of 
execution. A writ of execution under Rule 69 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is 
the procedure by which a judgment lien is foreclosed by the sheriff. Thus, a stay of 
execution would have only delayed the foreclosure of the judgment lien and would 
have had no effect on the validity of the lien. 
Similarly, the posting of security is generally required when a judgment debtor 
seeks to stay the enforcement of a judgment against him pending appeal. In the 
present case, Horbach was the judgment creditor, not the judgment debtor. As such, 
there was no need for Horbach to post security before seeking further review of the 
opinion made by the Court of Appeals. Indeed, because Utah law provides that a 
district court is divested of jurisdiction over a judgment until the entire appellate 
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process is completed, there was no reason for Horbach, as the judgment creditor, to 
obtain a stay of remittitur as long as he timely filed his petition for certiorari. 
Nevertheless, Appellee argues that the Appellant could have protected itself 
easier than Appellee by obtaining a stay of remittitur. Appellant disagrees for several 
reasons. First, the Utah Constitution and the Utah Judicial Code, rather than the rule 
on remittitur, control the appellate jurisdiction of this Court. Second, controlling 
case law provides that the District Court was divested of jurisdiction over the 
Judgment until the entire appellate process had been concluded. Third, the decision 
of the Court of Appeals does not provide that it is to be self-executing upon its entry; 
rather, it provides that it was remanding the case to the District Court for further 
action consistent therewith. Obviously, if the opinion was self-executing, no such 
mandate would have been given. Fourth, the District did not vacate or alter its 
Judgment, which remained in the judgment docket, because the Judgment was still 
subject to review by this Court. Finally, because the Judgment remained in the 
judgment docket pending appeal, the trust deed taken against the judgment debtor's 
property thereafter was subject to the judgment lien, which was prior in time. 
REPLY POINT III 
HORBACH'S PETITION FOR CERTIORARI WAS 
GRANTED BY THE UTAH SUPREME COURT LONG BEFORE 
THE DEED OF TRUST WAS RECORDED AGAINST THE PROPERTY 
A comparison of this Court's docketing statement granting certiorari on 
February 13, 1996 (see Appellant's Exhibit G(3) at 1), with the date on the lender's 
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trust deed made on May 24, 1996 and recorded on May 31, 1996, conclusively 
establishes that the trust deed was made and recorded against judgment debtor's 
property after certiorari had been granted by this Court, and all arguments made to 
the contrary are unfounded. 
Appellant argued in its opening brief that Horbach 5s petition for certiorari was 
indeed filed and granted by this Court long before the trust deed was recorded against 
the property, In response, Appellee now concedes that the Horbach petition was not 
only filed but granted before the trust deed was recorded against the property. 
Appellee also does not contend that the trust deed was taken without notice of 
the Judgment or that it obtained priority over Appellant's Judgment as a good faith 
purchaser for value without notice pursuant to the provisions of the Utah Recording 
Act. See Utah Code Ann. § 57-3-103 et seq. 
Contrary to Appellee's argument, Appellant is not arguing that the granting of 
Horbach's petition for certiorari by this Court constituted the reversal of the Court of 
Appeals' decision, but rather that the filing and granting of the petition for certiorari 
by this Court divested the District Court of jurisdiction over the Judgment until this 
Court had completed its review of the Judgment. This is particularly true in a case 
such as this one where this Court was reviewing a decision made by the Court of 
Appeals pursuant to the pour-over provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2, which 
provides, in relevant, part as follows: 
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(4) The Supreme Court may transfer to the Court of Appeals any of 
the matters over which the Supreme Court has original appellate 
jurisdiction, except: 
(a) capital felony convictions or an appeal of an interlocutory 
order of a court of record involving a charge of a capital felony; 
(b) election and voting contests; 
(c) reapportionment of election districts; 
(d) retention or removal of public officers;J 
(e) matters involving legislative subpoenas; and 
(f) those matters described in Subsections (3)(a) through (d). 
(5) The Supreme Court has sole discretion in granting or 
denying a petition for writ of certiorari for the review of a Court of 
Appeals adjudication, but the Supreme Court shall review those cases 
certified to it by the Court of Appeals under Subsection (3)(b). 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j), (4) & (5)(emphasis added). There is nothing in the 
foregoing statute which provides that the trial court is re-vested with jurisdiction in a 
case when this Court has undertaken to review a decision by the Utah Court of 
Appeals in the event the record on appeal is sent to the district court. 
In sum, there is simply no question that the Utah Legislature has given this 
Court the sole and exclusive discretion of reviewing decisions of the Court of 
Appeals in civil cases of this nature, and that this Court had the power to hold in Hi-
3
 Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 provides that "[t]he Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, 
including jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over: . . . (i) cases transferred to the Court of 
Appeals from the Supreme Court." (Id.) 
15 
Country and White, that jurisdiction does not re-vest in the district court until the 
appeal pending before this Court has been concluded. 
REPLY - POINT IV 
APPELLANT'S JUDGMENT LIEN IS SUPERIOR 
AND SENIOR TO ANY INTEREST ARISING UNDER 
THE JUNIOR TRUST DEED 
A. THIS CASE DOES NOT INVOLVE A RENEWAL JUDGMENT 
BUT A JUDGMENT THAT WAS AFFIRMED AND REINSTATED 
ON APPEAL 
In its opening brief Appellant argued that the District Court erred by citing to 
Cox v. Corp. v. Vertin, 754 P.2d 938 (Utah 1988) and concluding that because a 
judgment lien which arises from a new or renewed judgment does not relate back to 
the date of entry of the original judgment, a lien arising from a reinstated judgment 
must also lose its priority. 
In response, Appellee argues that even if Cox is distinguishable, a judgment 
lien ceases to exist when the underlying judgment expires. However, unlike Cox, the 
life of the present Judgment did not expire and Appellant is not asserting a judgment 
lien without an underlying Judgment. Rather, Appellant asserts that its judgment lien 
arose from the time its Judgment was entered by the District Court in the judgment 
docket. Moreover, because the Judgment has never been expunged from the 
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judgment docket, it retained its priority based on the date of its original entry when 
the Judgment was reinstated by this Court on appeal.4 
The cases cited by Appellee are inapplicable and easily distinguished for the 
several reasons. First and most importantly, this Court's appellate jurisdiction is 
established in part by the Constitution of Utah, Art. VIII, § 3 which provides in 
relevant part that: 
The Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction over all other 
matters to be exercised as provided by statute, and power to issue all 
writs and orders necessary for the exercise of the Supreme Court's 
jurisdiction or the complete determination of any cause. 
Id. Based upon the power conferred upon it in the foregoing section and the 
discretionary power given to this Court by the Utah legislature, pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. §78-2-2(5), this Court had the power to hold in Hi-Country and White that 
when this Court undertakes review of a judgment, the trial court is divested of 
jurisdiction until this Court has completed its determination of the matter. 
Appellee's reliance on Timm v. Dewsmip, 921 P.2d 1381, 1393 (Utah 1996) is 
misplaced for several reasons. First, in the decision this Court noted that the lis 
pendens, which had been filed on the records of the county recorder, had been 
released and that the buyers were indeed good faith purchasers for value and 
therefore entitled to priority under the Utah Recording Act. In the present case, 
4
 The facts are undisputed, and the District Court docket confirms, that the Judgment has 
never been expunged, altered or removed from the District Court's Docket. 
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Appellant's Judgment was not expunged or removed from the District Court's 
docket. Moreover, because the judgment lien arose from the Judgment, any creditor 
who dealt with the property thereafter had notice that the Judgment was on appeal 
thereby giving notice of the pending litigation. Therefore, anyone taking an interest 
in the property, including Appellee's predecessor-in-interest took that interest subject 
to the litigation as explained by this Court in Hidden Meadows Dev. Co. v. Mills, 590 
P.2d 1244, 1248 (Utah 1979), which is the case cited and relied upon by the Court in 
the Timrn decision. In Timm this Court stated: 
Even if the property were purchased subsequent to the trial court's 
release of the lis pendens, such purchaser may have had actual notice of 
the pending litigation. Such purchaser would be in the same position as 
one who had constructive notice of the litigation subject to a lis 
pendens. 
Id. at 1393 (citing Tuft v. Federal Leasing, 657 P.2d 1300, 1302-03 (Utah)). In the 
present case, the Judgment remained of record and therefore Appellee's predecessor-
in-interest took its interest in the subject property with notice of the pending litigation 
concerning the Judgment. Thus, this Court's decisions in Timm and Hidden 
Meadows both support Appellant's position. 
B. THE DISTRICT COURT'S JUDGMENT REMAINED 
UNCHANGED DURING THE APPELLATE PROCESS 
Appellee cites to footnote 1 of the Utah Court of Appeals' decision and 
concludes that the opinion was a self executing judgment. Appellant disputes 
Appellee's argument that the Court of Appeals intended its decision to be self 
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executing. The Court of Appeals' decision it made clear that it was remanding the 
case for further action by the District Court. The Court remanded: 
Because we conclude the trial court erred when it held the accord and 
satisfaction unenforceable for lack of consideration and because we 
conclude the agreement was not founded upon a mutual mistake of fact, 
we reverse and remand for further action consistent with this 
opinion. 
England v. Horbach et al, 905 P.2d 301 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (see Appellant's 
Exhibit G (5), page 6) (emphasis added). The language is simple, clear and not 
subject to confusion, that the case was remanded for further action. However, no 
further action was taken by District Court because the Judgment was subject to this 
Court's judicial review. 
The decision mMerhish v. HA. Folsom & Associates, 648 P.2d 731 (Utah 
1982), to the extent the case has any applicability, supports Appellant's position. The 
case stands for the proposition that when a case on appeal becomes moot, the 
appellate court should vacate and remand that the case to the trial court so that the 
trial court can enter the appropriate order of dismissal. It does not stand for the 
proposition that no remand is necessary. 
Appellant's attempts to distinguish Hi-Country are also unpersuasive. The 
holding that a trial court is divested of jurisdiction over a case while it is under 
advisement on appeal was based, in part, on this Court's holdings in White v. State, 
795 P.2d 648 (Utah 1990) and Smith v. Kimball, 76 Utah 350, 289 P. 588 (1930). 
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This case is indeed similar to Hi-Country because the Court of Appeals 
remitted the record to the trial court even though a petition for certiorari was timely 
filed and subsequently granted by this Court. Because the Judgment was under 
review on appeal, the files should have been held by the Court of Appeals until this 
Court had decided whether to grant the petition for certiorari. Once the petition was 
granted, the files should be forwarded to the clerk of this Court. Appellee's 
arguments to the contrary are misplaced. 
Finally, Appellee is correct in its argument that unlike Hi-Country where the 
trial court erroneously took some action, the District Court took no action in the 
present case to vacate the Judgment before this Court had completed its review of the 
case. 
C. EVEN HAD THE JUDGMENT BEEN VACATED (WHICH IT 
WASN'T), THE JUDGMENT WAS REINSTATED BY THE UTAH 
SUPREME COURT 
Appellee has utterly failed to distinguish this Court's decision in Hewitt v. 
General Tire and Rubber Co., 302 P.2d 712 (Utah 1956) from the present case. In 
Hewitt this Court explained the effect of a reinstated judgment as follows. 
The court's order entering judgment for the defendant was in error and 
abortive, and when this court issued its mandate ordering the 
judgment for defendant vacated and the judgment on the verdict 
for plaintiff reinstated, it vitalized that judgment to the same extent 
and with the same force as though the trial court had never entered 
the abortive and erroneous judgment for defendant. 
Id. at 713 (emphasis added). 
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Based upon the foregoing doctrine, when this Court reinstated the 
Judgment on appeal, it vitalized the Judgment to the same extent and with the 
same force as if the Court of Appeals had never opined that the District Court 
erred in making the Judgment. ^  
D. APPELLEE'S PREDECESSOR TOOK ITS SECURITY 
INTEREST IN THE PROPERTY SUBJECT TO 
APPELLANT'S JUDGMENT LIEN 
This Court has previously held that one who obtains an interest in property 
"with full knowledge that the property taken is the subject of on-going litigation 
acquires only the grantor's interest therein, subject to whatever disposition the court 
might make of it." Hidden Meadows Development Company v. Mills, 590 P.2d 1244, 
1248 (Utah 1979). 
The Hidden Meadows decision deals with whether a lis pendens operates to 
give proper notice post-judgment and during an appeal when the plaintiff failed to 
obtain a supersedeas bond. Id. In this case, Appellee has argued extensively that 
Horbach could have obtained a stay had it obtained a supersedeas bond. [Appellee's 
Brief at 16-19] In Hidden Meadows, the Court rejected a similar argument: 
Appellants further contend that since plaintiff failed to obtain a 
supersedeas bond it was not entitled to a stay of proceeds and that 
such failure in some way rendered the notice given by the recorded 
lis pendens ineffectual. For two very obvious reasons, that 
5
 It is also noteworthy that Appellee has not cited any authority in support of its position that 
a reinstated judgment does not relate back to its initial entry, when the Judgment remained 
on the judgment docket. 
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contention is without merit. First, and foremost, the 'failure' to 
accomplish any number of imaginable things in no way alters the 
inescapable fact that a duly recorded lis pendens serves as notice to 
all persons. It is an elementary principle of real estate law that 
those who deal in property interests are bound by those matter that 
appear of public record and one may not be penalized or deprived 
of the effectiveness of such notice as is imparted by the record 
simply because of some unrelated action or inaction of his or 
others. Such was merely available to him. The fact that none was 
flirnished is of no consequence in this case. This is found to be so 
when it is observed that the purpose and effect of supersedeas is to 
restrain the successful party an the lower court from taking 
affirmative action not enforce a judgment or decree. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
The rationale of the Hidden Meadows case is applicable to the case 
at bar. Here, the Judgment Creditor did not have a mere Us pendens 
recorded against the property with the county recorder but rather its 
Judgment was reflected in the judgment docket. Therefore, any person 
interested in taking a security interest in the debtor's property had notice 
that the Judgment had been entered against the judgment debtor in Salt 
Lake County and that the Judgment was under review by this Court. With 
notice of the foregoing Judgment and the associated judgment lien, 
Appellee's predecessor was certainly in the position to know whether the 
collateral offered by the judgment debtor was adequate to secure 
repayment of its loan. Appellee's argument that "there is no authority" for 
the proposition that a judgment under review by this Court "provides 
constructive notice of an interest in real property" ignores the reality that a 
?2 
judgment lien arises by operation of law pursuant to Utah Code Ann, 78-
22-1, and that it is therefore standard practice for all title companies in 
Utah to check judgment dockets before insuring an interest in real 
property. 
CONCLUSION 
The ruling made by the District Court in this action is erroneous and contrary 
to law for the various reasons set forth in Appellant's opening and reply briefs. 
WHEREFORE, Appellant prays the Court to reverse the judgment made by 
the District Court and to declare that Appellant's Judgment and the lien which arose 
therefrom are valid and enforceable against the subject property from the date the 
Judgment was first made and entered on the judgment docket, and that the Sheriff of 
Salt Lake County may proceed with the execution sale thereof in compliance with 
Rule 69 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
j_V\, 
Respectfully submitted this \Q day of June, 2002. 
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